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Abstract
Ordering alternatives by their degree of ambiguity is a crucial element in decision-
making processes in general and in asset pricing in particular. Thus far the literature
has not provided an applicable measure of ambiguity allowing for such ordering. The
current paper addresses this need by introducing a novel empirically applicable ambiguity
measure derived from a new model of decision making under ambiguity in which proba-
bilities of events are themselves random. In this model a complete distinction is attained
between preferences and beliefs and between risk and ambiguity that enables the degree
of ambiguity to be measured. A merit of the model is that ambiguous probabilities can
be incorporated into asset prices and an ambiguity premium can be measured empirically.
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11 Introduction
How should uncertain alternatives be ranked by the criterion of ambiguity? Consider the
following example: a large urn contains 30 balls which are either black or yellow and a second
smaller urn contains only 10 balls which are also either black or yellow. In the large urn there
are at least 16 black balls, while in the small urn there are at least 5 black balls. Which of the
following two bets is more ambiguous? “A ball drawn from the large urn is black” or, “A ball
drawn from the small urn is black.” Say you were oﬀered $10 if a ball drawn from the large
urn is black and $12 if a ball drawn from the small urn is black. Which of these two bets would
you choose? Answering questions of these types is part of almost any real-life decision. They
imply that decision-making involves the ordering of alternatives by their degree of ambiguity.
However, so far the literature has not provided a useable measure of ambiguity that allows
for such ordering. The goal of this paper is to provide a theoretical basis and an applicable
measure that address this need.
This paper makes three contributions to the existing literature. The ﬁrst and main con-
tribution is that it introduces a novel, empirically applicable, ambiguity measure, underpinned
by a new theoretical concept.1 The second contribution is that it presents a decision-making
model to derive this measure. This model completely distinguishes preferences from beliefs and
risk from ambiguity, thereby allowing the degree of ambiguity to be measured independently of
preferences, particularly in empirical studies. It also allows aspects of preferences concerning
ambiguity to be monitored in behavioral studies. Unlike previous decision-making models which
resemble cases with only a single Ellsberg urn, this model resembles cases involving multiple
urns. The third contribution is that it generalizes classical asset pricing theory to incorporate
ambiguity, providing a well-deﬁned ambiguity premium which is clearly distinguished from risk
and can be tested empirically.
Assuming that probabilities of events are themselves random, this paper introduces a novel
model of decision making, referred to as expected utility with random probabilities (henceforth
EURP), which aims to capture the multi-dimensional nature of uncertainty. In this model,
there are two tiers of uncertainty: one with respect to consequences and the other with respect
to the probabilities of these consequences. Each tier is modeled by a separate state space. This
structure introduces a complete distinction of risk from ambiguity with regard to both beliefs
and preferences. The degree of risk and attitudes toward it are then measured with respect to
1Throughout this paper the term ambiguity measure is used informally.
2one space, while ambiguity and ambiguity attitudes are measured with respect to the second
space. Ambiguity and preferences concerning it are applied directly to probabilities of events
independently of their outcomes.
The main idea of EURP is that perceived probabilities are formed by the “certainty equiva-
lent” probabilities of objective random probabilities.2 That is to say, the perceived probability
is the unique probability value that the DM is willing to accept in exchange for the uncertain
probability of a given event. As a consequence of probabilistic sensitivity (i.e., the nonlinear
ways in which individuals may interpret probabilities), perceived probabilities are nonadditive.
Ambiguity aversion results in a subadditive subjective probability measure, while ambiguity
loving results in a superadditive measure. It is her perception of probabilities that ultimately
guides her decision-making process.
A natural merit of EURP is that, like measuring the degree of risk by the variance of
outcomes, the degree of ambiguity can be measured by the variance of probabilities.3 However,
concerning the variance of probabilities, the question is: to the probability of which event is
the variance applied? This paper proves that the degree of ambiguity can be measured by four
times the variance of the probability of loss, which is equal to four times the variance of the
probability of gain. Formally, our measure of ambiguity is given by
f
2 = 4Var[PL] = 4Var[PG],
where PL and PG are the random probabilities of loss and gain, respectively, and the variance
is taken with respect to second-order probabilities. The intuition behind this new measure
is that ambiguity is caused by a perturbation of probabilities with respect to a meaningful
reference point. Its main advantage is that it can be computed from the data and can be used
in empirical tests.
Measuring the degree of ambiguity allows alternatives to be ranked by the criterion of
ambiguity. It provides a way to address important questions that arise regarding the nature
of ambiguity, in general, and the nature of the aggregate ambiguity of portfolios, in particular.
The nature of ambiguity and the relationship between risk and ambiguity may shed some light
on various puzzling ﬁnancial phenomena. Notable examples are the fact that individuals tend
to hold very small portfolios, 3-4 stocks (Goetzmann and Kumar (2008)), the equity premium
puzzle (Mehra and Prescott (1985)), the risk-free rate puzzle (Weil (1989)), the phenomenon
2In this paper the terms perceived probabilities and subjective probabilities are used interchangeably.
3Measuring risk by the variance of outcomes is admissible under some conditions; the same is true for
measuring ambiguity by the variance of probabilities.
3of the observed equity volatility being too high to be justiﬁed by changes in the fundamental
(Shiller (1981)) and the home bias puzzle (Coval and Moskowitz (1999)).
To demonstrate the value of EURP and its measure of ambiguity, this paper generalizes
asset pricing theory to incorporate ambiguity. Relaxing the assumption that probabilities are
known, the price of an asset in our model is determined not only by its degree of risk and
the DM’s attitude toward risk, but also by its degree of ambiguity and the DM’s attitude
toward ambiguity. The current paper constructs an uncertainty premium and proves that it
can be separated into a risk premium and an ambiguity premium.4 It provides a well-deﬁned
ambiguity premium, completely distinguished from risk and attitude toward risk, and which
can be computed from the data. This model has been tested empirically by Brenner and
Izhakian (2011), who show that ambiguity, measured by f2, has a signiﬁcant impact on the
market portfolio return. We are not aware of any prior study that conducts direct empirical
tests of models of decision making under ambiguity other than through parametric ﬁtting and
calibrations.5
EURP relies on the Choquet expected utility (CEU) of Schmeidler (1989), whose axiomatic
derivation paved the way for modeling decision making under ambiguity. Gilboa (1987) and
Schmeidler (1989), in their pioneering studies, introduce the idea that, in the presence of
ambiguity, the probabilities that reﬂect the DM’s willingness to bet cannot be additive, i.e.,
the sum of the probabilities can be either smaller or greater than 1. EURP combines the concept
of nonadditive probabilities with the idea of reference-dependent beliefs. Reference dependency
is applied to diﬀerentiate between the probability of gain and the probability of loss. It allows
preferences concerning ambiguity which pertain to these probabilities to be diﬀerent for losses
and for gains.
Tversky and Kahneman’s (1992) cumulative prospect theory (CPT) also applies a two-sided
CEU to gains and to losses.6 However, CPT focuses on reference-dependent preferences. It
assumes a DM having diﬀerent risk attitudes for losses and for gains and asymmetric capacities
with diﬀerent arbitrary weighting schemes for losses and for gains.7 EURP shows that capacities
4This paper uses the term uncertainty to describe the aggregation of risk and ambiguity.
5Uppal and Wang (2003), Epstein and Schneider (2008), and Ju and Miao (2012), for example calibrate
their model to the data. Several papers attribute diﬀerent explanatory variables to ambiguity. For example,
Anderson et al. (2009) and Drechsler (2012) attribute the disagreement of professional forecasters to ambiguity.
6Using the perception of rank-dependent and cumulative functionals proposed by Weymark (1981), Quiggin
(1982), Yaari (1987) and Schmeidler (1989), CPT generalizes the original prospect theory of Kahneman and
Tversky (1979) from risk to uncertainty. It modiﬁes the probability weighting functionals of the original prospect
theory, such that it always satisﬁes stochastic dominance and supports an inﬁnite state space.
7Capacities are (subjective) nonadditive probabilities. This paper uses the term probability in a broad sense,
4are not arbitrary and can be explained by the presence of ambiguity and preferences concerning
it.8 It relies on the axiomatic foundation proposed by Wakker (2010) for both risk and ambiguity
preferences. EURP stems from the multiple priors paradigm (Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989))
and results in a two sided variation of CEU (Gilboa (1987) and Schmeidler (1989)).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 establishes the setup. Section 3
introduces a new decision-making model under ambiguity and characterizes DMs’ attitudes
toward ambiguity. Using this model, Section 4 suggests a measure of ambiguity. To demonstrate
an application of EURP for asset pricing, Section 5 models the ambiguity premium and reviews
an empirical methodology to test it. Section 6 discusses our results with respect to the related
literature, and Section 7 concludes.
2 The setup
EURP assumes two diﬀerent tiers of uncertainty, one with respect to consequences and the other
with respect to the probabilities of these consequences. Each tier is modeled by a separate state
space. Uncertainty with respect to consequences (outcomes) is modeled in a primary outcome
space, while uncertainty with respect to probabilities is modeled in a secondary probability space.
2.1 Illustration
To illustrate the idea behind EURP about the nature of ambiguity and the way individuals
perceive it, consider an Ellsberg urn with 90 colored balls, 30 of which are red and the other
60 either black or yellow. Drawing (at random) a red ball (R) entitles the DM to a sum of $0,
a yellow ball (Y ) entitles her to a sum of $1, and a black ball (B) entitles her to a sum of $2.
In terms of EURP, the primary space is deﬁned by the states of drawing diﬀerent balls, i.e.,
{R,Y,B}, and the secondary space is deﬁned by the composition of the urn. The probabilities
of drawing diﬀerent balls are thus deﬁned by this composition. The probability of R is exactly
1




90. The precise probability
of B is determined by a second-order unobservable event in the secondary space. Such an event
can be, for example, “The experimenter put 30 red balls, 20 black balls and 40 yellow balls in
the urn.” The DM does not have any information indicating which of the possible probabilities
is more likely, and thus she assigns an equal weight to each possibility.
i.e., it can be nonadditive and either subjective or objective.
8To explain capacities, EURP does not assume asymmetric risk attitude, diﬀerent ambiguity preferences for
losses and for gains, or loss aversion.
5Assume a DM whose preferences concerning ambiguity are given by Γ(P) =
√
P, and her
preferences concerning risk are given by U(c) = 1−e−c. While making decisions, the DM ﬁrst
forms her perceived probabilities as the certain probabilities she is willing to accept in exchange
for the undertrain probabilities. For example, the perceived probability of B, derived from the

















































































Consider now the well-known Ellsberg (1961) experiment in which the subjects are asked
to choose between R and B and then to choose between RY and BY . In this experiment
individuals usually prefer R over B, but BY over RY .9 Let the prize of winning a bet be $1
and otherwise $0, and assume a DM who considers strictly positive outcomes as a gain and
otherwise as a loss. These preferences coincide with the expected utility of each bet, obtained
by applying the method above separately for gains and losses. Table 1 is a stylized description
of this example.
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Table 1: The Ellsberg example
The choices observed in the Ellsberg experiment also coincide with the ordering provided
9In expected utility theory, the DM’s assessments of the likelihoods of R, B and Y can be described by
some probability measure P. The DM is assumed to prefer a greater chance of winning $1,such that the choices
above imply that P(R) > P(B) and P(B ∪ Y ) > P(R ∪ Y ). However, since R, B and Y are mutually exclusive
events, no such probability measure exists; hence, it is considered a paradox.
6by the measure of ambiguity, f2. The degree of ambiguity of B, measured by utilizing the
variance of the probability of gain from this bet, is f2 [B] = 0.1530. The probability of gain
attained by the alternative bet, R, is exactly 1
3, implying a zero degree of ambiguity, f2 [R] = 0.
Since the expected outcomes (E) of R and B are identical, an ambiguity-averse DM prefers R,
which has the lower degree of ambiguity, over B. The probability of gain from RY can take
one of the values 30
90, 31
90,... 90
90, which in turn implies f2 [RY ] = 0.1530. The probability of gain
from the alternative BY is exactly 2
3, which implies f2 [BY ] = 0. Therefore, an ambiguity-
averse DM prefers BY over RY . Note that the variance of outcomes, computed using expected
probabilities, is identical for all the alternative bets.
2.2 The primary space
Observable events and their consequences are deﬁned by the primary space. The probabilities
of these events are uncertain; as a consequence, perceived probabilities are nonadditive. Non-
additive priors are also assumed in the foundation of Schmeidler’s (1989) CEU and Tversky
and Kahneman’s (1992) CPT. The primary space relies on this foundation, while the reasoning
for nonadditive priors is provided later by the secondary space.10
Let S be a (ﬁnite or inﬁnite) nonempty state space, called the primary space, endowed
with a σ-algebra, E, of subsets of S.11;12 Generic elements of this σ-algebra are called primary
events (events for short) and are denoted by E. Deﬁne X to be a nonempty convex set of
consequences, where, since this paper mostly deals with monetary outcomes, consequences are
conﬁned to real numbers, X ⊆ R.
A primary act (ﬁrst-order act) is a measurable function from states into consequences,
f : S → X, describing the resulting consequence associated with each state s ∈ S. The set of
all primary acts is denoted F. Restricting attention to simple measurable acts, a primary act
f ∈ F0 is represented as a sequence of pairs
f = (E1 : x1,··· ,Ej : xj,··· ,En : xn),
where xj is the consequence if event Ej occurs, and (E1,...,En) is a generic partition of the
state space S. Sometimes, when the context is clear, the primary act f with a vector of outcomes
(x1,...,xn) is referred to as a random variable, possibly without speciﬁed probabilities, and
10CEU and CPT do not characterize the sources shaping the nonadditive priors.
11To simplify the exposition, whenever possible our results are proved in static discrete settings; however all
of the presented results can be applied to dynamic continuous settings.
12Following Wakker and Tversky (1993), Wakker (2010, Appendix G) and Kothiyal el al. (2011), the state
space, S, can consist of an inﬁnite number of states.
7designated xj = f (sj) by fj.
The notation f = (E1 : x1,··· ,En : xn) presupposes that the consequences x1,...,xn are
listed in a non-decreasing order. All consequences x ∈ X are interpreted either as a gain or
as a loss with respect to the reference point xk ∈ X, which is common to all primary acts.13
Any consequence xj ∈ X is a loss if xj ≤ xk and a gain if xk < xj. The cumulative events of
loss and gain are thus deﬁned by L = E1 ∪ ··· ∪ Ek and G = Ek+1 ∪ ··· ∪ En, respectively. To
shorten notations, the convention Ej···t = Ej ∪ ··· ∪ Et is used to denote cumulative events.14
A capacity Q is a function on 2S assigning each event A ⊆ S with a number Q(A), satisfying
Q(∅) = 0, Q(S) = 1, and if A ⊂ B ⊂ S then 0 ≤ Q(A) ≤ Q(B).15 The capacity of any loss
event 1 ≤ j ≤ k is deﬁned by Q(E1 ∪ ··· ∪ Ej) − Q(E1 ∪ ··· ∪ Ej−1), and the capacity of
any gain event k + 1 ≤ j ≤ n is deﬁned by Q(Ej ∪ ··· ∪ En) − Q(Ej+1 ∪ ··· ∪ En), where
E0 = En+1 = ∅. Note that, since Q can be nonadditive, the capacities do not necessarily sum
up to 1.
The domain of ﬁrst-order preference relation, %1, is the set of primary acts, F0, and the
relations -1, ≺1, ≻1 and s1 are deﬁned as usual. A primary act yielding the same consequence
for any state s ∈ S is called a constant act and is designated by its constant consequence x ∈ X.
The certainty equivalent (CE) of a primary act f ∈ F0 is a constant act, x ∈ F0, such that
f s1 x.




[Q(E1···j) − Q(E1···j−1)]U(fj) +
n ∑
j=k+1
[Q(Ej···n) − Q(Ej+1···n)]U(fj), (1)
where U : X → R is a strictly increasing continuous utility function satisfying U(xk) = 0. As
usual, U characterizes the DM’s preferences concerning risk: a concave function implies risk
aversion, and a convex function implies risk loving. Similarly to Equation (1), the value of a















    U(fs) > t
})
dt. (2)
Assuming that the preference relation %1 on the set of primary acts F0 satisﬁes Wakker’s
(2010, Theorem 12.3.5) axiomatization, %1 can be represented by the function v such that
13It is common to assume that the reference point is the status quo, exogenously given.
14Similarly, this notational convention is applied to other variables, such as Pj···t = P(Ej ∪ ··· ∪ Et).
15Capacities can be applied directly to consequences without specifying an underlying state space, i.e.,
Q(c ≤ x ≤ c), where c and c are constants; see Jaﬀray (1989).
16In the case of an inﬁnite support, notations are abused and k stands for xk.
8v(f) ≥ v(g) iﬀ f %1 g, for any f,g ∈ F0.17 The function v applies a two-sided Choquet
integration to gains and to losses (relative to the reference point). The representation deﬁned
by v and axiomatized in Wakker (2010, Theorem 12.3.5) diﬀers from the Choquet integral in
that the latter satisﬁes a “shift” axiom (i.e.,
∫
S (f + c)dQ =
∫
S fdQ + c for every f and c),
whereas the former is sensitive to shifts of outcomes crossing the reference point. Note that
in both representations lower capacities imply lower values of acts, regardless of whether the
capacities are of losses or of gains.
2.3 The secondary space
Probabilities over the primary space are assumed to be random and determined by unobservable
events in a separate latent state space, referred to as the secondary space. While making her
choice, the DM does not know which event will be realized, either in the primary space or in the
secondary space. That is, she knows neither the realized outcome nor the realized probabilities
of outcomes.
Objective probabilities P of events E ∈ E occurring in the primary space are random and
determined by secondary events in a (ﬁnite or inﬁnite) nonempty state space Ω, called the
secondary space. A secondary event, denoted D, is a generic element of a σ-algebra, D, of subsets
of Ω, and (D1,...,Dm) denotes a generic partition of the secondary space Ω. A consequence







. P denotes the set of consequential probability measures. In a ﬁnite primary space
the probability measure Pi takes the form of a probability vector Pi = (Pi;1,...,Pi;j,...,Pi;n),
assigning to each primary event Ej its possible probabilities, where Pi;j stands for P
(
Ej
    Di
)
.
A secondary act (second-order act) is a measurable function from the secondary state space
into the set of probability measures, ˆ f : Ω → P, describing the resulting probability measure
associated with each secondary state ω ∈ Ω. The set of secondary acts is denoted   F. Restricting
attention to simple measurable (with respect to Ω) acts, a secondary act ˆ f ∈   F0 is represented
as a sequence of pairs
ˆ f = (D1 : P1,...,Di : Pi,...,Dm : Pm),
where Pi is the probability measure of event Di occurring. In this framework, a (roulette)
lottery is given by a constant ˆ f, assigning every D ∈ D with the same probability measure.
17Alternative axiomatizations that could be adopted are Tversky and Kahneman (1992), Wakker and Tversky
(1993), Chew and Wakker (1996) and Kothiyal et al. (2011).
9The projection of a secondary act on E induces eventwise secondary acts which assign each




















of the partition (D1,...,Dm) such that its probabilities (P1;j,...,Pm;j) are
listed in a non-decreasing order. The set of Ej’s secondary acts is denoted   Fj. When the
context is clear, ˆ fj is referred to as a secondary act and the index j designates the primary
event. In this context, ˆ fj can be viewed as a random variable describing the probability Pj
of Ej. A secondary act ˆ fj, assigning Ej with the same probability for any D ∈ D, is called a
constant secondary act and is designated by its outcome probability Qj.
A second-order additive probability measure χ on 2Ω assigns to each secondary event D ⊆ Ω
a probability χ(D). Figure 1 provides a diagrammatic representation of the two spaces: the








Figure 1: The two spaces
The DM is assumed to have a second-order preference relation %2
j, which is a complete order,
deﬁned over the set of secondary acts   Fj. EURP proposes that %2
j is utilized solely to form the
DM’s perceived probability of the primary event Ej. As such, %2
j can be considered as if it is
applied only to secondary acts associated with the same primary act f, i.e., to secondary acts
deﬁning the random probability of the same outcome. Given a secondary act ˆ fj, the preference
%2
j is used only to extract the constant secondary act Qj which satisﬁes ˆ fj s2
j Qj. Each Qj,
referred to as the perceived probability (of event Ej), is formed separately. Relying on these
10perceived probabilities, Qj, the DM then makes her choices.
2.4 The objects of choice
The objects of choice are acts, denoted f. An act is a measurable function f : S × Π → X,
where Π is a set of families of probability distributions, P, and the product space S × Π is
endowed with the product σ-algebra E ⊗ P of E and a σ-algebra P of subsets of Π.18 The set
of all acts is denoted F. In this framework, an act f ∈ F0 is induced by a primary act f ∈ F0
and a secondary act ˆ f ∈   F0, where ˆ f deﬁnes the family (subset) of probability measures, P,
associated with f. Thus, an act f ∈ F0 can be represented as a sequence of pairs
f = ((E1,P) : x1,··· ,(Ej,P) : xj,··· ,(En,P) : xn).




, where ˆ fs = Ps = (P1;s,...,Pm;s) is the projection of P
on s. The preference %, which is a complete order, over the set of acts F0 is assumed to be a
primitive and is induced by the preferences %1 and %2
j over F0 and   Fj, respectively.
It might be helpful at this point to illustrate our setup using the following three-color
Ellsberg urns. Assume two urns, f and g, each containing 100 balls in red, black and yellow.
Drawing a red ball (R) from f entitles the DM to a sum of $0, a yellow ball (Y ) entitles her to
a sum of $1, and a black ball (B) entitles her to a sum of $2. Drawing a red ball (R) from g
entitles the DM to a sum of $1, a yellow ball (Y ) entitles her to a sum of $3, and a black ball
(B) entitles her to a sum of $2. It is known that the proportions of the balls R, B, Y in f can
be either (40,20,40) or (20,60,20) with equal likelihoods. The former is obtained if the event
α occurs and the latter is obtained if the event β occurs. The proportions of balls in g can be
either (50,40,10) or (10,40,50), also with equal likelihoods, where the former is obtained if α
occurs and the latter is obtained if β occurs. Table 2 summarizes this example.
Outcome Probabilities Distribution
R Y B R Y B α β
f $0 $1 $2 (0.2,0.4) (0.2,0.6) (0.2,0.4) (40,20,40) (20,60,20)
g $1 $3 $2 (0.1,0.5) (0.4,0.4) (0.1,0.5) (50,40,10) (10,40,50)
Table 2: Example - objects of choice
In EURP representation, this example is formulated as follows. The primary state space
is S = {R,Y,B}, and the secondary state space is Ω = {α,β}. The primary acts are deﬁned
18I thank Mark Machina for his relevant comment.
11by f = (R : 0,Y : 1,B : 2) and g = (R : 1,Y : 3,B : 2), and the secondary acts are deﬁned
by ˆ f = (α : (0.4,0.2,0.4),β : (0.2,0.6,0.2)) and ˆ g = (α : (0.5,0.4,0.1),β : (0.1,0.4,0.5)). The
eventwise secondary acts induced by ˆ f are thus ˆ fR = (β : 0.2,α : 0.4), ˆ fY = (α : 0.2,β : 0.6) and
ˆ fB = (β : 0.2,α : 0.4), and the eventwise secondary acts induced by ˆ g are ˆ gR = (β : 0.1,α : 0.5),
ˆ gY = (α : 0.4,β : 0.4) and ˆ gB = (α : 0.1,β : 0.5). The objects of choice (acts) can then be
deﬁned by f = ((R,(0.2,0.4)) : 0,(Y,(0.2,0.6)) : 1,(B,(0.2,0.4)) : 2) and
g = ((R,(0.1,0.5)) : 1,(Y,(0.4,0.4)) : 3,(B,(0.1,0.5)) : 2), where for short, we write only the
projections of probability measures on events.
3 The decision-making model
The main idea at the basis of EURP is that risk and risk preferences apply to the primary
space, whereas ambiguity and ambiguity preferences apply to the secondary space. EURP
assumes two diﬀerentiated phases in the decision-making process: probability formation and
valuation. In the formation phase, based on the information she has and her preferences
concerning ambiguity, the DM forms a representation of her perceived probabilities for all the
events which are relevant to her decision. Then, in the valuation phase, based on her preferences
concerning risk, the DM assesses the value of each act and chooses accordingly.
3.1 Attitudes toward ambiguity
Attitudes toward ambiguity are deﬁned by preferences over secondary acts in the formation
phase. Although the DM does not have an immediate choice over secondary acts, her sub-
jective perception of likelihoods, resulting from an aversion to or love of ambiguity, plays an
important role in her decision process. Secondary acts cannot be chosen independently of
primary acts; still, in many decision problems second-order preferences can be inferred from
observable choices. For example, in the Ellsberg urn experiment, secondary acts may be con-
sidered as bets on the composition of the urn. In ﬁnancial decisions, secondary acts can be
viewed as bets about the means, variances and covariances of the investment opportunities.
Similarly, secondary acts in model-uncertainty applications can be considered as bets about
the true values of the parameters of the model.
Attitudes toward ambiguity are deﬁned by DMs’ preferences over random probabilities of
primary events and their expected probabilities, i.e., preferences over secondary acts and con-
stant secondary acts, respectively. An ambiguity-averse DM prefers the expectations of the ran-
12dom probabilities over the random probabilities themselves. An ambiguity-loving DM prefers
the random probabilities over their expectations, and an ambiguity-neutral DM is indiﬀerent
between them. The next deﬁnition settles this idea formally.







and its related constant







, where E[Pj] =
∑m
i=1 χiPi;j is the expected
probability of event Ej, taken with respect to the second-order probabilities χ. Ambiguity aver-
sion (loving) as regards event Ej is deﬁned by ¯ ˆ fj %2
j ˆ fj ( ¯ ˆ fj -2
j ˆ fj), and ambiguity neutrality is
deﬁned by ¯ ˆ fj s2
j ˆ fj.19;20
A DM is said to be ambiguity averse if ¯ ˆ fj %2
j ˆ fj for any Ej ∈ E. Ambiguity-loving DMs and
ambiguity-neutral DMs are deﬁned similarly. Deﬁnition 1 can be applied to formulate diﬀerent
attitudes toward ambiguity for diﬀerent subsets of events; for example, ambiguity loving for
losses and ambiguity aversion for gains. The next theorem ties preferences concerning ambiguity
to a functional representation.




to each secondary act




















where Γj : [0,1] → R is a strictly increasing continuous function. Assume that the preference
relation, %2
j, on the set of acts   Fj satisﬁes: weak ordering, monotonicity, continuity and sign-
tradeoﬀ consistency.21 The preference %2
j can then be represented by the function Q, such that




iﬀ ˆ gj %2
j ˆ fj, for any ˆ fj, ˆ gj ∈   Fj.22;23
The function Γj, referred to as a probability-outlook function (outlook function for short),
forms the DM’s attitude toward ambiguity. As with risk attitudes, there are three types of
attitudes toward ambiguity: ambiguity aversion, ambiguity loving and ambiguity neutrality.
Ambiguity neutrality takes the form of a linear Γ, ambiguity aversion the form of a concave
Γ and ambiguity loving the form of a convex Γ. Two special types of ambiguity preferences
can be deﬁned. Constant relative ambiguity aversion (CRAA), which takes the functional form
19Strict preferences toward ambiguity can be deﬁned similarly.
20Epstein (1999) deﬁnes ambiguity aversion relative the probabilistically sophisticated order of Machina and
Schmeidler (1992).
21Weak ordering, monotonicity and continuity are deﬁned as usual. Sign-tradeoﬀ consistency sustains if
improving a consequence in any indiﬀerence relation s breaks the relation. Formally, if (E : a,Ec : x) s
(E : b,Ec : y) and (E : a′,Ec : x) s (E : b,Ec : y) then a′ = a.
22Alternatively, one can employ an SEU axiomatization.
23The proof of Theorem 1 is directly derived from Wakker (2010, Theorem 12.3.5), where probabilities are
additive and no distinction of losses from gains is made.
13Γ(P) = P1−
1− , and constant absolute ambiguity aversion (CAAA), which takes the functional
form Γ(P) = −e−P
 , where η is the coeﬃcient of ambiguity aversion.
The concept of ambiguity and preferences concerning it, proposed in Theorem 1, suggests a
deﬁnition of subjective probabilities. The subjective probability Q(Ej) of event Ej, formulated
in Equation (3), provides a nonlinear model for the way that individuals may perceive proba-




. Considering for example an ambiguity-averse DM, Equation (3)
implies that a higher aversion to ambiguity (a more concave Γ function) or a higher dispersion
of probabilities, both result in lower perceived probabilities which in turn result in a lower value
of the act.
The perceived probabilities of an ambiguity-neutral DM are additive and equal to the ex-
pected probabilities, i.e., Q(Ej) = E[Pj].24 The perceived probabilities of an ambiguity-averse
DM are lower than the expected probabilities, i.e., Q(Ej) < E[Pj], and result in subaddi-
tive probabilities. The perceived probabilities of an ambiguity-loving DM are greater than the
expected probabilities, i.e., Q(Ej) > E[Pj], and result in superadditive probabilities. These
perceived probabilities provide an explanation for the nonadditive priors of Gilboa (1987) and
Schmeidler (1989), which are arbitrary in CEU and CPT.
What meaning do perceived probabilities have? Given an ambiguous lottery and a non-
ambiguous lottery with identical prizes for each event such that the DM is indiﬀerent between
them, the perceived probabilities are deﬁned by the probabilities of the non-ambiguous lottery.
These perceived probabilities can be tested by a simple variation of the Ellsberg three-color
experiment. Subjects can be asked to propose an urn with a known proportion of balls which
they are willing to accept in place of an urn with an unknown proportion of balls, where the
prizes attached to each color are the same in both urns.
3.2 The functional representation
Given an act f : S×Π → X, in the ﬁrst phase of the decision-making process—the probability
forming phase—the DM designs her perceived probabilities. This phase, which reduces Π to a
subjective probability measure Q, is carried out using preferences over secondary acts. In the
second phase—the valuation phase—the DM uses Q to asses the value of the act. This phase
is carried out using preferences over primary acts. The next theorem combines the preferences
over primary acts, F0, and over secondary acts,   Fj, introducing a functional representation of
24An ambiguity-neutral DM can be considered a DM who reduces two-stage lotteries to compound lotteries
in the usual way. For the implications of this type of preferences see, for example, Halevy (2007).
14preferences over acts F0.










































to each act f ∈ F0. Assume that the preference relation % over F0 satisﬁes Wakker’s (2011)
axiomatization, and the preference relation %2
j over   Fj satisﬁes the conditions of Theorem 1
for any Ej ∈ E. The preference relation % over F0 can then be represented by the function V,
such that V(g) ≥ V(f) iﬀ g % f, for any f,g ∈ F0.
Theorem 2 ties risk preferences to ambiguity preferences when acts have a ﬁnite support.






































The functional representation of the DM’s aggregate preferences, proposed in Theorem 2,
makes a complete distinction between beliefs and preferences and between risk and ambiguity.
First-order beliefs are formed by the random probability measures Pi=1;:::m; second-order beliefs
are formed by the probability measure χ; risk preferences are formed by the utility function U;
and ambiguity preferences are formed by the outlook function Γ.
Risk and ambiguity preferences, in Theorem 2, can be diﬀerent for losses and for gains;
their functional representation can take the form U = U
− and Γ = Γ− for losses, and U = U
+
and Γ = Γ+ for gains. Diﬀerent utility functions, U
− and U
+, can capture, for example,
loss aversion.25 Diﬀerent outlook functions, Γ− and Γ+, can capture, for example, ambiguity
loving for losses and ambiguity aversion for gains.26 Pessimism and optimism can also be
incorporated into Theorem 2 by the probability weights w− (Q) and w+ (Q) for losses and for
gains, respectively. Pessimism holds if greater weights are assigned to lower ranked outcomes,
and optimism holds if greater weights are assigned to higher ranked outcomes. In principle, a
DM in this extension can exhibit ambiguity aversion while still being an optimist.
25Loss aversion is modeled by a steeper utility function for losses than for gains (see, for example, Barberis
and Huang (2001)). Some behavioral studies report risk aversion for gains and risk loving for losses (see, for
example, Abdellaoui et al. (2008)).
26Some behavioral studies document ambiguity loving for losses and ambiguity aversion for gains (see, for
example, Bier and Connell (1994)).
15Although Theorem 2 grants the DM the ﬂexibility of having diﬀerent attitudes for diﬀerent
events, henceforth it is assumed that the DM has a consistent attitude toward ambiguity for all
events. Thus, her preferences concerning ambiguity are formed by the same outlook function
Γ for any primary event Ej ∈ E.
It is important to note that, while risk considers both consequences and their probabilities,
ambiguity considers only probabilities. The type and magnitude of a consequence resulting
from a primary event are not relevant to its degree of ambiguity. Consider, for example, an
event with an unknown probability of losing $100. Changing the magnitude of loss to $1000
does not aﬀect either its perceived probability or its degree of ambiguity.
The separation attained in Theorem 2 allows for studying the distinct impact of each com-
ponent on values of acts. More importantly, it enables the simpliﬁcation of this model to
an applicable form such that the degree of ambiguity can be measured, as proposed later in
Section 4.
3.3 Perceived probabilities
We turn now to study the properties of perceived probabilities, proposed in Theorem 1, and to
simplify their functional representation. Let




be the expected probability of event Ej and
ζ
2
j = Var[Pj] =
m ∑
i=1
χi (Pi;j − pj)
2
be its variance. The covariance of the probabilities of two events Ej and El is deﬁned by
ζj;l = Cov[Pj,Pl] =
m ∑
i=1
χi (Pi;j − pj)(Pi;l − pl).
Perceived probabilities Q, deﬁned in Theorem 1, are a function of ﬁrst-order (random) ob-
jective probabilities, second-order objective probabilities and preferences concerning ambiguity.
To simplify the exposition of Theorem 2 and Theorem 1, the perceived probability Q(Ej) of
each event Ej is approximated by taking a second-order Taylor approximation with respect to
its ﬁrst-order probabilities Pj around its expected probability pj.27 Since this approximation
deals with probabilities, a condition on the outlook function Γ is enforced to assure that the
approximated perceived probabilities are nonnegative.
27The same method is applied by Arrow (1965) and Pratt (1964) to outcomes within the expected utility
framework, whereas in this case it is applied to probabilities.
















for any events Ej,El ∈ E, where j∪l stands for Ej∪El. For relatively small ﬁrst-order objective
probabilities, Pj, the perceived probability of event Ej is then













Theorem 3 characterizes capacities since Q(∅) = 0, Q(S) = 1, and Q(A) ≤ Q(B) if A ⊂ B ⊂ S

















j +2j;l. It assures that the approx-
imated probabilities are nonnegative and that the probability of an event is not lower than
the probability of any of its sub-events. Condition (5), however, is required only for the pur-
pose of approximation and it is not enforced over the precise perceived probabilities deﬁned in
Equation (3). Henceforth it is assumed that the outlook function Γ falls under this condition.









is referred to as the probability premium of event Ej, and ζ2
j is referred to as the ambiguity
of event j (e-ambiguity for short). The expression −
Γ′′(pj)
Γ′(pj) is referred to as the coeﬃcient of
absolute ambiguity aversion, and −pj
Γ′′(pj)
Γ′(pj) is referred to as the coeﬃcient of relative ambiguity
aversion.28
The probability premium is composed of two components: ambiguity preferences, framed
by Γ′′
Γ′ , and the degree of e-ambiguity, measured by ζ2. Preferences concerning ambiguity
can be aversion (Γ′′
Γ′ < 0), loving (Γ′′
Γ′ > 0) or neutrality (Γ′′
Γ′ = 0), which imply subadditive,
superadditive and additive probabilities, respectively. When the probability of an event is
perfectly known, its e-ambiguity is zero, ζ2 = 0, and so is the probability premium. This is also
true when the DM is ambiguity neutral. Considering an ambiguity-averse DM, a higher aversion
to ambiguity or a higher degree of e-ambiguity both imply a greater probability premium and
a lower perceived probability. Note that by Condition (5) the coeﬃcient of absolute ambiguity
aversion is bounded such that for a suﬃciently high level of ambiguity aversion the perceived
probability of each event tends to zero.
28These deﬁnitions are equivalent to the Arrow-Pratt coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion and coeﬃcient of
relative risk aversion, respectively.
17In general, the subjective probability measure Q is nonadditive, that is Q(El···t ∪ Et+1···j) ̸=
Q(El···t) + Q(Et+1···j). This measure has an additive component—the expected probability
p(El···t ∪ Et+1···j) = p(El···t)+p(Et+1···j), and an additional nonadditive component—the prob-
ability premium. The source of nonadditivity is e-ambiguity, measured by ζ2




t+1···j.29 The probabilities of events are not independent. Therefore,
the ambiguity of a union of events comprises the covariances between the probabilities of its
sub-events, as the next proposition implies.








The ambiguity of event E and its complement event Ec is a special case since the e-ambiguity
of their union equals zero, i.e., ζ2
S = 0.
Lemma 2. The covariance between the probability of event E and the probability of its com-
plement event Ec satisﬁes
Cov[P(E),P(E




The results of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 coincide with the ﬁndings of support theory of Tversky
and Koehler (1994) and Rottenstreich and Tversky (1997). Support theory documents that
the judged probability of an event generally increases when its description is unpacked into
disjoint components and decreases by unpacking its alternative description. One may conclude
from Lemma 1 that unpacking an event into disjoint components which satisfy ζ1···t;t+1···j < 0
increases its probability as perceived by ambiguity-averse DMs.
3.4 Simplied representation
The perceived probabilities, proposed in Theorem 3, provide a way to simplify the functional
representation of preferences over acts to a more usable form. The value of an act f ∈ F0,




[pj − φ1···j + φ1···j−1]U(fj) +
n ∑
j=k+1
[pj − φj···n + φj+1···n]U(fj), (6)
















to obtain the M¨ obius transform of two
events (see, for example, Chateauneuf and Jaﬀray (1989) and Grabisch et al. (2000)).




j···t. When an attitude toward ambiguity is diﬀerent for gains and for









G(pj···n) for any gain event k + 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
Assume, for example, an ambiguity-averse DM who exhibits CAAA. Since p is additive and
for any event −Γ′′































The ﬁrst component of the value function is the conventional expected utility. The last two
components are the disutility caused by the presence of ambiguity. If the DM’s preferences







































Almost any real-life decision is concerned with ambiguity. One of the ﬁrst steps of any decision-
making process is to rank the diﬀerent alternatives by their degree of ambiguity. The key to
addressing this need is a well-deﬁned measure of ambiguity.30
4.1 Ordering ambiguous events
A preliminary step in ordering acts by their degree of ambiguity is to deﬁne an order over
primitive events. Such an order, induced by the DM’s preferences, can be deﬁned as follows.
Denition 3. Let the random probability of event Ej ∈ E have the same expected probability
under acts f ∈ F0 and g ∈ F0, i.e., pf;j = pg;j.31 Event Ej is more ambiguous under act f than
under act g if ˆ gj %2
j ˆ fj by any ambiguity-averse DM.
This deﬁnition provides a subjective ordering that arises from preferences. Recall that
preferences concerning ambiguity apply only to the probabilities of events and not to their
outcomes. A higher perceived probability (capacity) of an event, resulting from lower ambiguity,
implies a higher value of an act regardless of whether this event is associated with a loss or a
gain. An objective ordering can be deﬁned as follows.32
30Jewitt and Mukerji (2011) investigate the ranking of ambiguous acts as revealed by the DM’s preferences.
31The notations pf;j and ζ2
f;j stand for the expected probability and the e-ambiguity of event Ej under act f.
32Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) apply a similar idea for risk with respect to outcomes.
19Denition 4. Event Ej ∈ E is more ambiguous under act f ∈ F0 than under act g ∈ F0 if there
exists a random variable ϵ such that
Pf;j − pf;j =d Pg;j − pg;j + ϵ,
where =d means equal in distribution and E
[
ϵ
    Pg;j
]
= E[ϵ] = 0.33
The subjective ordering in Deﬁnition 3 coincides with the objective ordering in Deﬁnition 4,
as the following theorem asserts.
Theorem 4. When event Ej ∈ E has the same expected probability under acts f ∈ F0 and
g ∈ F0, then Deﬁnitions 3 and 4 of the more ambiguous event coincide.
Events can be ordered in a third way, by their degree of ambiguity, measured by ζ2.




This deﬁnition implies that the higher the ﬂuctuation of the probability of an event, the
greater its ambiguity. Ordering events by ζ2 coincides with the ordering of Deﬁnitions 3 and 4
if probabilities are equable-symmetrically distributed or if the DM’s attitude toward ambiguity
is quadratic or of the CAAA type. Formally, the probability of event Ej is said to be equable-
symmetrically distributed if it satisﬁes Ps+i+1;j − Ps+i;j = ∆ and χs−i = χs+i, ∀i = −s,...,s,
where s is the point of symmetry.
Theorem 5. Given an event Ej ∈ E which has the same expected probability under acts f ∈ F0
and g ∈ F0, Deﬁnitions 3, 5 and 4 are equivalent if one of the following conditions holds:
(i) The probabilities of Ej are equable-symmetrically distributed under f and under g;
(ii) The DM’s attitude toward ambiguity is of the CAAA type;
(iii) The DM’s attitude toward ambiguity is quadratic.
Henceforth, it is assumed that the probabilities of all events are equable-symmetrically
distributed. If needed, this assumption can be replaced by assuming CAAA or a quadratic
outlook function, Γ. At this point, the order of eventwise secondary acts by e-ambiguity is
well-deﬁned. This order induces only a partial order on the set of acts F0. E-ambiguity induces
a total order on subsets of F0 which satisfy the following condition.
Denition 6. Let acts f,g ∈ F0, whose probabilities are equable-symmetrically distributed, have
the same expected probabilities. Act f is more ambiguous than act g if for any event Ej ∈ E







= E[ϵ] means that ϵ is mean-independent of the random probability Pg;j of Ej
under g, i.e., a mean-preserving spread.
20Assuming aversion to ambiguity, Deﬁnition 6 states that if for any event the random proba-
bility associated with act g is preferred to the random probability associated with act f, then f
is more ambiguous than g. This deﬁnition together with Theorem 5 imply that if for any event
Ej ∈ E the e-ambiguity of g is not higher than the e-ambiguity of f, i.e., ζ2
f;j ≥ ζ2
g;j, then f is
more ambiguous than g. In other words, act f is more ambiguous than act g if the probabilities
associated with it are consistently more volatile than the probabilities associated with act g.
Together, Deﬁnition 6 and Theorem 5 deﬁne ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance with respect
to ambiguity. Deﬁnition 6 can be rephrased as follows: act f is more ambiguous than act g if f
is stochastically dominated by g with respect to ambiguity. Figure 2 illustrates two acts, where
f is stochastically dominated by g. The values on the y-axis are the degrees of ambiguity of
the cumulative events lying on the x-axis. Note that the degree of ambiguity of the entire state
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Figure 2: First order stochastic dominance with respect to ambiguity
4.2 The ambiguity measure
The ambiguity measure introduced in this section considers symmetric acts. Formally, an
act f is said to be a symmetric act around the point of symmetry xs if its probabilities are
equable-symmetrically distributed and it satisﬁes xs − xs−j = xs+j − xs and Pi;s−j = Pi;s+j,
∀j = −s,...s and ∀i = 1,...m.34 The ambiguity measure utilizes the cumulative probability
of loss and the cumulative probability of gain. It relies on Lemma 2, which implies that the
variances of these two probabilities are identical, that is, Var[PL] = Var[PG]. The next theorem
proposes one of the main results of this paper: a new measure of ambiguity. It asserts that the
34When measuring ambiguity, the more restrictive assumption of normally distributed outcomes which allows
measuring risk by variance, can be relaxed to symmetric distribution.
21degree of ambiguity embedded in an act can be measured by twice the sum of the variance of
its cumulative probability of loss and the variance of its cumulative probability of gain.
Theorem 6. The degree of ambiguity of a symmetric act f, denoted f2, can be measured
by
f
2 [f] ≡ 2Var[PL] + 2Var[PG] = 4Var[PL]. (7)
The normalized measure (to the units of probability) is deﬁned by f[f] ≡ 2
√
Var[PL].
The ambiguity measure f2 induces a total order on acts that satisfy ﬁrst-order stochastic
dominance with respect to ambiguity. Theorem 7 below proves that this order coincides with the
order provided by a DM. The idea that ambiguity, formed by probability ﬂuctuations, should
be measured with respect to a meaningful reference point stands behind the construction of
f2. Since decisions are concerned with potential loss, a natural reference point is the outcome
which distinguishes losses from gains.
Assume, for example, that strictly positive outcomes are considered a gain in the well-known
Ellsberg three-color experiment (see Section 2.1). The probability of drawing a black (B) ball




90, each with equal likelihood. This implies that
the normalized degree of ambiguity (to units of probability) of this bet is f[B] = 0.3912.
Assume that instead of 60 black and yellow balls in an unknown proportion, the urn contains
only 30 black and yellow balls in an unknown proportion, in addition to 30 red balls. The
degree of ambiguity of the bet on B decreases to f[B] = 0.2981. If the quantity of balls which
may be black or yellow in an unknown proportion is 90, then the degree of ambiguity of the bet
on B increases to f[B] = 0.4377. If the urn contains only 60 balls, all of them black or yellow
in an unknown proportion, then the degree of ambiguity, which in this case is identical for black
and yellow, is f = 0.5868. If there are only 10 balls in the urn (and again the proportion of
black and yellow is unknown), then f = 0.6324. Lastly, if there is only one ball in the urn, of
unknown color, then f = 1, and in the other extreme case, if there is an inﬁnite number of
balls in the urn, then f = 1 √
3. Table 3 is a stylized description of these variations.
The minimal possible degree of ambiguity, f2 = 0, is attained when all probabilities are
perfectly known. The maximal possible degree of ambiguity, f2 = 1, is attained when the
probability of loss (or gain) is either 0 or 1 with equal odds. In this most extreme case,
the variance of the probability of loss attains its maximal possible value, 1
4. Variances of
probabilities are therefore normalized by 4 to provide an ambiguity measure ranging between
0 and 1. Note that f2 depends on a reference point, xk, which determines the set of gain
22#Balls
Total R Y B PG f[B]












∞ 0 0...∞ 0...∞ 0...1 0.5773








1 0 0,1 0,1 0,1 1
Table 3: Degrees of ambiguity
outcomes and the set of loss outcomes. If xk = min(x) or xk = max(x), i.e., outcomes are
considered either all as gain or all as loss, then the degree of ambiguity equals zero. If there
is a reference point agreed upon by all DMs, f2 can be considered an objective measure of
ambiguity; otherwise it is considered a subjective measure. Concerning ﬁnancial assets, for
example, the risk-free rate of return can possibly be an objective reference point agreed upon
by all ﬁnancial DMs.
The measure of ambiguity, f2, takes into account the impact of the correlations between
probabilities across events. One can deﬁne the absolute degree of ambiguity of act f by   f2 [f] ≡
∑n
j=1 Var[Pj].35 Great caution should be exercised when using   f2—probabilities are almost
always correlated such that   f2 is biased in the sense that it ignores these correlations. In
other words, this measure disregards an important piece of information concerning the nature
of probabilities and, as a result, the nature of ambiguity.
The point to emphasize is that the measure of ambiguity f2 is not aﬀected by the magnitude
of outcomes, in general, and the magnitude of loss or gain, in particular. Increasing or decreasing
the outcomes of an act (and accordingly the reference point) does not change its degree of
ambiguity, but it does change its degree of risk. A decision-making process considers not
only the degree of ambiguity but also the degree of risk. Hence, when making choices these
two factors jointly play a role. A consolidated uncertainty measure that aggregates risk and






















as the relative degree of
ambiguity (with respect to expected probabilities).
23To prove that f2 measures ambiguity, it has to be shown that the ordering of acts by
f2 coincides with the ordering provided by a DM. To inspect the impact of ambiguity, the
ordering is made over acts with identical properties except for the degree of ambiguity. That is,
they have the same outcomes and the same expected probability (implying the same risk) such
that the only diﬀerence between them is the dispersion of probabilities around their expected
probabilities. To eliminate the eﬀect of risk preferences, the DM is assumed to be risk neutral.
Since acts are assumed to be symmetric, and thus the point of symmetry xs equals the expected
outcome, it is assumed that the reference point satisﬁes xk ≤ xs; otherwise, the DM will not
consider these acts.
Theorem 7. Assume symmetric acts f,g ∈ F0, satisfying ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance with
respect to ambiguity, having the same outcomes and the same expected probability for each event,
i.e., E[Pf;j] = E[Pg;j], ∀j = 1,...,n. Act f is more ambiguous than act g, i.e., f2 [g] ≤ f2 [f],
iﬀ any ambiguity-averse DM, with a reference point xk ≤ xs, prefers g to f.
This theorem ties f2 to preferences concerning ambiguity. It proves that if two acts are
identical except in their degree of ambiguity, then any ambiguity-averse DM prefers the act
with the lower f2 over the act with the higher f2.
5 Implementation for asset pricing
One of the advantages of EURP is that it achieves a complete separation of ambiguity from risk
and beliefs from preferences. To demonstrate this merit, this section presents an application
of the theory to asset pricing. The prices that ﬁnancial decision makers (investors) are willing
to pay for assets could be aﬀected by the fact that they do not know the precise probabilities
of returns. They might require a premium for bearing ambiguity in addition to the premium
they require for bearing risk.
The risk premium is the premium that a DM is willing to pay for exchanging a risky
bet for its expected outcome. The ambiguity premium is the premium she is willing to pay
for exchanging an ambiguous bet for a risky but non-ambiguous bet that has an identical
expected outcome. The uncertainty premium is the total premium that a DM is willing to pay
for exchanging an ambiguous bet for its expected outcome, i.e., the accumulation of the risk
premium and the ambiguity premium. The uncertainty premium, denoted K, can be deﬁned
24by
U(E[x] − K) t
k ∑
j=1
[pj − (φ1···j − φ1···j−1)]U(xj) +
n ∑
j=k+1
[pj − (φj···n − φj+1···n)]U(xj), (8)
where CE = E[x] − K ∈ F0 is the certainty equivalent, satisfying CE s f. That is, it is the
constant act for which the DM is willing to exchange a risky and ambiguous (uncertain) act.
The next theorem approximates the uncertainty premium and separates it into a risk premium
and an ambiguity premium.
Theorem 8. Assume a DM whose reference point xk is relatively close to zero, satisfying
0 ≤ xk ≤ E[x], and her preferences are characterized by a twice-diﬀerentiable utility function,
U, and a twice-diﬀerentiable outlook function, Γ. For relatively small outcomes with relatively























      
A
, (9)
where R is the risk premium and A is the ambiguity premium.
This theorem provides two distinctions. First, it distinguishes between risk and ambiguity
premiums such that these two premiums are orthogonal. Second, within each premium it
distinguishes between sources of premiums, preferences and beliefs.
Concerning ﬁnancial decisions, outcomes can be described by rates of return, r. In this case,




















The risk premium, R t −1
2
U′′(E[r])
U′(E[r])Var[r], is the Arrow-Pratt risk premium, where Var[r] is
computed using expected probabilities. Independently, a higher risk or a higher aversion to it,
measured by the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion −U′′
U′ , result in a greater risk premium.








f2 [r], possesses attributes resem-
bling those of the risk premium, but with respect to probabilities rather than to consequences.
A complete separation between beliefs about random probabilities, measured by f2, and pref-
erences concerning it, measured by the coeﬃcient of absolute ambiguity aversion, −Γ′′
Γ′ , is
achieved. Ambiguity aversion (−Γ′′
Γ′ > 0) implies a positive ambiguity premium. Ambigu-
ity loving (−Γ′′
Γ′ < 0) implies a negative premium. Ambiguity neutrality (−Γ′′
Γ′ = 0) implies a
zero premium, obtained also when probabilities are perfectly known (f2 = 0). Independently,
a higher degree of ambiguity or a higher ambiguity aversion result in a greater ambiguity pre-
25mium. As an example, the next corollary shows the diﬀerent premiums in the case of a DM
typiﬁed by CRRA and CAAA.










1− , γ ̸= 0
ln(rj) − ln(rk), γ = 0




then the uncertainty premium is K t γ 1
2Var[r] + η 1
4f2 [r].
When the expected probabilities of loss and gain are relatively close to 1
2, the ambiguity
premium can be simpliﬁed such that the expected return (equity premium) is














where rf stands for the risk-free rate of return.
The pricing model of Equation (11) has been tested empirically by Brenner and Izhakian
(2011). They assume a pricing representative investor whose reference point is the risk-free
rate. Their study employs the measure of ambiguity, f2, as an explanatory factor of the
aggregate return on the stock market. It assumes that market return is normally distributed
with random parameters, mean and variance, which govern its distribution. Using the S&P 500
intraday data, they extract the monthly degree of ambiguity by utilizing the following four-step
methodology. The ﬁrst step is to sample 20 to 22 groups, each comprising 26 observations (15-
minutes returns) from the monthly data. The second step is to compute the mean and variance
of each group. The third step is to compute the probability of a return lower than the risk-free
rate (loss) for each group, using its mean and variance. At this point, for each month there are
20-22 probabilities of loss. The last step is to compute the variance of these probabilities to
obtain the monthly degree of ambiguity f2.
Brenner and Izhakian (2011) conduct a series of tests to study the explanatory power of f2
on the stock market return. They show that ambiguity has a signiﬁcant impact on returns in
both contemporaneous and prediction testing, which means that monthly return on the stock
market is not only aﬀected by the ambiguity in the same month, but also by the ambiguity in
the previous month.
36A more standard formulation of CRRA, U(r) = r
1−
1− for γ ̸= 1 and otherwise for γ = 1 U(r) = ln(r), is
not always normalized to U(rk) = 0.
266 Related Literature
Since the seminal works of Knight (1921) and Ellsberg (1961), utility theory research has made
a concerted eﬀort to model decision processes under uncertainty and to explain the violation of
expected utility theory. This eﬀort has generated the ideas that, in the presence of ambiguity,
the DM’s beliefs take the form of either multiple priors or a single but nonadditive prior. In their
max-min expected utility with multiple priors model, Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) assert that
an ambiguity-averse DM possesses a set of priors and evaluates her ex-ante welfare conditional
upon the worst prior. The subjective nonadditive probabilities of Gilboa (1987), the CEU of
Schmeidler (1989) and the CPT of Tversky and Kahneman (1992) state that uncertainty and
aversion to it can be represented by a single subadditive prior. EURP’s contribution to this
literature is twofold. First, it achieves a complete separation between ambiguity and attitudes
toward it. Second, it proves that capacities are not arbitrary and can be explained by the
presence of ambiguity and the DM’s preferences concerning it.
The concept of modeling attitudes toward ambiguity by relaxing the reduction between
ﬁrst-order and second-order probabilities, suggested by Segal (1987), inspires other models:
Klibanoﬀ et al.’s (2005) smooth model of ambiguity, its generalization to include intertemporal
substitution, proposed by Ju and Miao (2012) and Hayashi and Miao (2011), and the second-
order beliefs of Nau (2006), Chew and Sagi (2008), Ergin and Gul (2009) and Seo (2009). Unlike
these models, in which ambiguity preferences are taken with respect to expected utilities or
certainty equivalents, in EURP ambiguity preferences are applied solely to probabilities. This
approach distinguishes between the eﬀects of risk and the eﬀects of ambiguity, such that it
allows for the measurement of the degree of ambiguity.
EURP can be interpreted as a model of robustness in the presence of model uncertainty.
This class of models assumes an uncertainty about the true probability law governing the
realization of states, and a DM, with her concerns about misclassiﬁcation, looks for a robust
decision-making process; see, for example, Hansen et al. (1999), Hansen and Sargent (2001)
and Maccheroni et al. (2006). Ambiguity in this line of models is formulated by the deviation
of probability from a reference probability (reference model), measured by relative entropy.37
EURP is also related to Siniscalchi’s (2009) vector expected utility, which assumes a baseline
probability and diﬀerent sources of ambiguity with respect to expected utility. Other models
37Relative entropy is the expected log Radon-Nikodym derivative. Technically, all alternative models have to
be absolutely continuous with respect to the reference model for an entropy measure to exist.
27that consider reference expected utility include those of Roberts (1980) and Quiggin et al.(2004),
for example, or consider a reference prior: Einhorn and Hogarth (1986), and Gajdos et al.
(2008), for example. Kopylov’s (2006) ϵ-contamination suggests the addition of an element of
conﬁdence to the generated set of priors. Chateauneuf et al. (2007) suggest new capacities
(neo-additives) obtained from a set of priors generated by ϵ-contamination. All these models
require the identiﬁcation of a reference prior while EURP requires only the identiﬁcation of a
reference point, which is easier to obtain, especially in empirical and experimental studies.
It is important to note that EURP diﬀers from all of the models mentioned above in one
major aspect: ambiguity and preferences concerning it are applied directly to probabilities and
not to any element of utility. That is, they are not applied to expected utility, certainty equiva-
lent or eventwise utility, all of which are derived from risk preferences. In EURP no need arises
to identify a reference probability distribution. It provides a formal way to compare the choices
of two DMs who have diﬀerent attitudes toward ambiguity or diﬀerent degrees of ambiguity—
for example, two DMs who share the same information and the same attitude toward risk but
have diﬀerent levels of ambiguity sensitivity, or two DMs who share the same attitude toward
risk and ambiguity but possess diﬀerent information (diﬀerent degrees of ambiguity). The abil-
ity to conduct this type of comparative static is of primary importance, as it allows for the
identiﬁcation of the pure eﬀect of introducing ambiguity and attitude toward it into a model.
Several approaches to estimating ambiguity have been suggested in the literature. Dow
and Werlang (1992) measure uncertainty as the sum of the probability of an event and the
probability of its complement event. Ui (2011) measures ambiguity by the diﬀerence between
the minimal possible mean and the true mean. Maccheroni et al. (2011) measure ambiguity by
the variance of an unknown mean. Bewley (2011) and Boyle et al. (2011) measure ambiguity
by a critical conﬁdence interval. All these studies assume that the variance of consequences is
known. Our ambiguity measure, f2, is broader; it assumes an unknown variance and allows all
other parameters that characterize probabilities to be unknown.
The implications of ambiguity regarding the equity premium have been studied mainly by
focusing on theoretical aspects. Chen and Epstein (2002), Izhakian and Benninga (2011), and Ui
(2011) add an ambiguity premium to the conventional risk premium. Maccheroni et al. (2011)
adjust the mean-variance paradigm for ambiguity to extract an ambiguity premium.38 Epstein
and Schneider (2007) employ the max-min model to study portfolio choice under ambiguity,
38Segal and Spivak (1990) also analyze the ambiguity premium, which they call a premium of order 2.
28and Epstein and Schneider (2008) employ it to show that the ambiguity premium depends
on the idiosyncratic risk in fundamentals.39 Unlike Theorem 8, these papers do not attain a
complete separation between preferences and beliefs and between risk and ambiguity.
7 Conclusion
In reality almost any decision involves ambiguity. It is natural to look for a simple measure
of ambiguity that allows for ordering uncertain alternatives by their degree of ambiguity. The
current paper satisﬁes this need by providing an ambiguity measure which can be employed in
empirical studies. Brenner and Izhakian (2011), for example, use this measure to inquire into
whether stock prices are aﬀected by ambiguity. Their empirical study shows that ambiguity
has a signiﬁcant impact on stock returns. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the ﬁrst
to measure ambiguity from market data, rather than in laboratory experiments or calibrations.
To construct a useful measure of ambiguity, the paper introduces a novel model of deci-
sion making under ambiguity. This model assumes that probabilities of observable events are
random and determined by second-order unobservable events, modeled by two separate state
spaces. This structure allows for a complete distinction between risk and ambiguity and be-
tween preferences and beliefs. The degree of risk and the decision maker’s attitudes toward
it are then measured with respect to one space, while the degree of ambiguity and attitude
toward it are measured with respect to the second space. Ambiguity and preferences concern-
ing it are applied directly to probabilities of events independently of their outcomes. In this
model, perceived probabilities are framed by the nonlinear ways in which individuals may in-
terpret probabilities. Perceived probabilities are nonadditive: ambiguity aversion results in a
subadditive subjective probability measure, while ambiguity loving results in a superadditive
measure.
In this paper, ambiguity takes the form of probability perturbation with respect to a ref-
erence point that distinguishes losses from gains. This concept provides a natural ambiguity
measure, which has proved to be empirically testable. The measure of ambiguity, f2, is simply
four times the variance of the probability of loss (or gain). The present paper demonstrates
the merits of this measure by incorporating ambiguous probabilities into the basic asset pricing
model. It generalizes the Arrow-Pratt theory and clearly diﬀerentiates between the risk pre-
39Mukerji and Tallon (2001) study the consequences of ambiguity aversion for idiosyncratic risk and risk
diversiﬁcation.
29mium and the ambiguity premium, which can both be measured empirically. Our measure of
ambiguity can be applied in empirical and behavioral studies in ﬁnance and economics.
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Lemma 3. Assume that the preference relation % over F0 satisﬁes the follwoing: weak ordering,
monotonicity, continuity, sign-tradeoﬀ consistency and gain-loss consistency.40 Then, for any
two acts f,g ∈ F0, there exists an act h ∈ F0 that has the same secondary act as f such that
h s g.










≤ pB for any
events A,B ⊆ S. If A ⊂ B then Q(A) ≤ Q(B).
Lemma 5. Assume two equable-symmetric eventwise secondary acts y,z ∈   Fj with an identical
mean, E[y] = E[z]. Let µk
y and µk











2 for any even k.
Lemma 6. Assume two equable-symmetric eventwise secondary acts y,z ∈   Fj with an identical
mean, E[z] = E[y]. Let σy and σz be their standard deviations. If λ = z
y then z =d λy.
A.2 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. By deﬁnition ζ2
1···j =
∑m
i=1 χi (Pi;1···j − p1···j)
2 . Since P is additive, p is
also additive, then ζ2
1···j =
∑m





















Proof of Lemma 2. Since Pi = Pi (E) is additive, P
c
i = Pi (Ec) = 1 − Pi. The covariance











χi (Pi − p)(p − Pi),














Proof of Lemma 3. By Wakker (2010, Theorem 12.3.5) and by Theorem 1, the value of
40Gain-loss consistency holds when f s g if f− s g− and f+ s g+, for all f,g ∈ F0, where f− and f+ are the
loss and gain parts of f, respectively.




[Q(ˆ g1···t) − Q(ˆ g1···t−1)]U(gt) +
n ∑
t=k+1
[Q(ˆ gt···n) − Q(ˆ gt+1···n)]U(gt).
One can deﬁne the outcomes of an act h, satisfying ˆ h = ˆ f, as follows. The outcome of a




Q( ˆ f1···j)−Q( ˆ f1···j−1)U(gt)
)





Q( ˆ f1···j)−Q( ˆ f1···j−1)U(gt)
)
if fj is a loss and gt is a gain. The outcome of a gain




Q( ˆ fj···n)−Q( ˆ fj+1···n)U(gt)
)





Q( ˆ fj···n)−Q( ˆ fj+1···n)U(gt)
)
if fj is a gain and gt is a loss. The ordering of gt is such that
the outcomes h1,...,hn are listed in a non-decreasing order. The outcome hj ∈ X exists
since U is continuous and strictly increasing and g is bounded; therefore, h ∈ F0. By con-
struction V(h) = V(g), which implies that the certainty equivalents of h and g are identical,
CE(h) = CE(g). By monotonicity CE(h) s CE(g), and by transitivity h s g.
Proof of Lemma 4. Writing C = A ∪ B, then by Theorem 3






























which is nonnegative by the Lemma’s hypothesis.
Proof of Lemma 5. Assume that y and z are normalized such that E[y] = E[z] = 0. Let
Y = yi+1 −yi and Z = zi+1 −zi, and recall that, since y and z share the same secondary space,





















































Proof of Lemma 6. Assume that y and z are normalized such that E[y] = E[z] = 0.
To show =d it has to be proved that λy and z have an identical characteristic function. The





l=1 χ(zl) + it
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z + ··· ,
(12)
where the kth moments µk
z around 0 are assumed to exist and to be ﬁnite, and µ0
z ≡ 1. The
36second equality is obtained from the power series of the exponential function. For the third


























2. Since y and z are equable-symmetrically
distributed, if k is odd then µk
y = µk


























= 1 then µk
y = µk
z and by Equation (12) ϕz (t) = ϕy (t), which implies
z =d λy.
Proof of Theorem 2. Assume two acts f,g ∈ F0 satisfying g % f. By Lemma 3 there
exists an act h ∈ F0 such that ˆ h = ˆ f, i.e., both acts have the same families of probability
measures, such that g s h. Since f and h depend only on S, by Wakker (2010, Theorem 12.3.5)
h % f ⇐⇒ V(h) ≥ V(f). By transitivity and Lemma 3, g % f ⇐⇒ V(g) ≥ V(f).
Proof of Theorem 3. The perceived probability, Q(Ej), of event Ej ∈ E can be written
Q(Ej) = Γ








for some φj. Taking the ﬁrst-order Taylor approximation of Γ(pj − φj) around pj yields
Γ(pj − φj) t Γ(pj) + Γ
′ (pj)(pj − φj − pj) = Γ(pj) − φjΓ
′ (pj). (14)
The second-order Taylor approximation of Γ(Pi;j), in Equation (13), around pj is
Γ(Pi;j) t Γ(pj) + Γ




′′ (pj)(Pi;j − pj)
2 .
Since Γ(pj), Γ′ (pj) and Γ′′ (pj) are constants, applying the weighted summation yields
m ∑
i=1











j. Substituting φj into Equa-
tion (13) proves the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 4. This proof considers ambiguity aversion; the proof for ambiguity
loving is similar. Let z = Pf;j − pf;j and y = Pg;j − pg;j, where Pf;j and Pg;j (pf;j and pg;j) are
the (expected) probabilities of event Ej ∈ E under acts f and g, respectively.
Assume that Ej is more ambiguous under f than under g, then by Deﬁnition 4 z =d y + ϵ.
The DM’s preferences %2






    y
]]
. Ignoring the expectation on the RHS for the moment, ambiguity aversion
formed by a concave Γ implies E[Γ(y + ϵ)] ≤ Γ(E[y + ϵ]) = Γ(y). Taking expectation yields
E[Γ(z)] ≤ E[Γ(y)]. Hence, ˆ gj %2
j ˆ fj.
For the opposite direction, let ˆ gj %2
j ˆ fj. Then, by Theorem 1, E[Γ(z)] ≤ E[Γ(y)]. It needs
to be shown that there exists an ϵ that satisﬁes Deﬁnition 4. The proof considers two secondary
events; it can then be extended to any number of secondary events. Let z and y take two possible
values, (z1,z2) and (y1,y2), with probabilities (α,1 − α) and (β,1 − β), respectively. Without
loss of generality, assume that z1 ≥ y1 ≥ y2 ≥ z2. The random variable ϵ can be constructed




























= 0. Therefore, y and ϵ are mean-independent and E[z] =








Since E[y] = E[z] then β =
z2−y2+(z1−z2)
y1−y2 . This implies that the probability of y + ϵ = z1
in Equation (16) is equal to α, and the probability of y + ϵ = z2 is equal to 1 − α. That is,
z =d y + ϵ.
Proof of Theorem 5. This proof considers ambiguity aversion; the proof for ambiguity
loving is similar. Let z = Pf;j − pf;j and y = Pg;j − pg;j, where Pf;j and Pg;j (pf;j and pg;j) are
the (expected) probabilities of event Ej ∈ E under acts f and g, respectively.
(i) Assume that Deﬁnition 4 holds. Since Pg;j and ϵ are mean-independent, Pf;j − pf;j =d
Pg;j − pg;j + ϵ implies that Var[Pf;j] = Var[Pg;j] + Var[ϵ] and therefore ζ2
f;j ≥ ζ2
g;j.






y ≥ 1. Since z and y are equable-symmetrically distributed and E[z] = E[y] = 0, λy
is also equable-symmetrically distributed with E[λy] = 0 and λ2Var[y] = Var[z]. Therefore, by
Lemma 6 z =d λy. Write x+y = α(x + λy)+(1 − α)x, where α = 1
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]
= E[x] = 0, then by the Jensen inequality Γ(x + y) ≥ αΓ(x + λy) +
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]]
+ (1 − α)E[Γ(x)]. (17)
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, which jointly
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]]
. Let x = 0, then
E[Γ(y)] ≥ E[Γ(λy)] = E[Γ(z)], which implies ˆ gj %2
j ˆ fj.
38(ii) Let Γ(z) = −e−z. Taking a second-order Taylor approximation around z = 0 yields
Γ(z) t −1+ηz − 1
2η2z2. Since E[z] = 0, taking expectation yields E[Γ(z)] t −1− 1
2η2Var[z].
This implies that y %2
j z iﬀ Var[y] ≤ Var[z]. That is, ˆ gj %2
j ˆ fj iﬀ ζ2
g;j ≤ ζ2
f;j.
(iii) Let Γ(z) = −(z − α)
2, where z ≤ α for some α. Taking expectation provides E[Γ(z)] =
−
(
Var[z] + (E[z] − α)
2)
. Since E[z] = E[y] = 0, then y %2
j z iﬀ Var[y] ≤ Var[z]. That is,
ˆ gj %2
j ˆ fj iﬀ ζ2
g;j ≤ ζ2
f;j.
Theorem 4 then completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 6. Assume two symmetric acts satisfying ﬁrst-order stochastic dom-
inance with respect to ambiguity and having an identical expected outcome and identical
expected probabilities. The ﬁrst equality is derived by Theorem 7, which proves that any
ambiguity-averse DM prefers the act with the lower f2 over the act with the higher f2. The
second equality is obtained by the fact that the variance of the probability of loss is equal to
the variance of the probability of gain (Lemma 2).
Proof of Theorem 7. Assume that f2 [g] ≤ f2 [f]. By Equation (6), the value assigned by







































Since f2 [g] ≤ f2 [f], by hypothesis act f is ﬁrst-order stochastically dominated (with respect
to ambiguity) by act g. By Theorem 5, any Ej ∈ E satisﬁes ζ2
f;j = ζ2
g;j + Var[ϵj], where ϵ and
Pg;j are mean-independent. The perceived probability of event Ej ∈ E under act f is thus


























































39Since fj = gj = xj,



























which, after rearranging terms, yields

























By ambiguity aversion, i.e.,
Γ′′(p1···n)
Γ′(p1···n) < 0 for any 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Since 0 ≤ (xj+1 − xj), the
second component in the ﬁrst line of Equation (19) is positive, while the second component in
the second line of Equation (19) is negative. Because acts are symmetric with xk ≤ xs, the
absolute value of the negative component is greater than the positive component. Thus, their
sum is negative. The ﬁrst components in the ﬁrst and the second lines of Equation (19) are
both negative; therefore, V(f) − V(g) ≤ 0, which by Theorem 2 implies g % f.
For the opposite direction, assume V(g) ≥ V(f). Since all the parameters in the value
functions V(f) and V(g) of acts f and g are identical except Var[PL], and ﬁrst-order stochastic
dominance with respect to ambiguity is satisﬁed, Equation (19) implies that Var[ϵ] ≥ 0. Thus,
Var[Pf;L] ≥ Var[Pg;L]. By Lemma 2 this is also true for PG; therefore, f2 [f] ≥ f2 [g].
Proof of Theorem 8. The ﬁrst-order Taylor approximation of the LHS of Equation (8)
with respect to K, around E[x], is
LHS = U(E[x] − K) =
n ∑
j=1
pjU(E[x] − K) t
n ∑
j=1
pj (U(E[x]) − KU
′ (E[x])).
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II = φ1···kU(xk) + φk+1···nU(xk+1) +
k−1 ∑
j=1
φ1···j [U(xj) − U(xj+1)] +
n ∑
j=k+2
φj···n [U(xj) − U(xj−1)]
and taking its ﬁrst-order Taylor approximation with respect to x, around E[x], yields41








′ (E[x])(xj − xj−1).
Since outcomes are assumed to be symmetrically distributed and xk is relatively close to E[x],
II t φ1···kU(E[x]) + φk+1···nU(E[x]).









































Proof of Corollary 1. CRRA implies U
′ (x) = x− and U
′′ (x) = −γx−−1. CAAA implies
Γ′ (Pi;j) = e−Pi;j and Γ′′ (Pi;j) = −ηe−Pi;j. Substituting into Theorem 8 proves the corollary.
41Note that φj is the probability premium, holding an order of magnitude of the variance of probabilities.
Thus, φj is smaller by one order of magnitude than probabilities.
42See, for example, Segal and Spivak (1990) and Levy et al. (2003).
41